Competitive Selection In Non-Competitive Structure– Some Methodological Issues by Sen, Subir Kumar & Roy, Chinmoy
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Competitive Selection In
Non-Competitive Structure– Some
Methodological Issues
Subir Kumar Sen and Chinmoy Roy
Tripura University
6 January 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47751/
MPRA Paper No. 47751, posted 22 June 2013 18:04 UTC
Competitive Selection in Non-Competitive Structure- Some 
Methodological Issues 
 
Abstract: The principal aim of this paper is to select a contractor who offers the best value 
for money. This will nearly always involve a process of competitive tendering. The final 
decision as to which contractor offers the best value for money will be determined by the 
factors like quality/price mechanism based on a numerical scoring and weighting system. 
However, in a political-emotional state of nature, this type of numerical scoring and 
weighting system, sometimes, faces the question of lack of transparency on the one hand and 
potential loss of resources of the authority on the other hand. This type of situation could 
have been resolved if the authority apply the reverse Delphi method. The advantage of this 
method is manifold- maintains transparency in the selection process; authority can achieved 
the least cost economic efficiency and, thereby, saves resources by utilising the competitive 
environment among the shortlisted contractors. 
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Organisations. 
 
JEL Code: K2, K4, L2, L7 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Selection of appropriate contractor is a crucial part in the literature of Economics of 
Infrastructure. The principal aim of the authority is to select the appropriate contractor out of 
available alternatives such that the best value for money is secured. This will nearly involve a 
process of Competitive Tendering where the best value for money of any project under 
consideration is achieved through optimizing the balance between Technical Efficiency and 
the Economic Efficiency of the project. The generally accepted view regarding the Technical 
Efficiency is that it runs in terms of quality of service where as the Economic Efficiency is 
achieved through securing the lowest price (or available lowest Price?) from the all potential 
contractor competing for the project. However, the traditional and the generally accepted 
concept of Competitive Bidding runs in terms of awarding the lowest responsible bidder or, 
on the refusal or failure of such bidder to execute a tendered contract, be awarded to the 
second lowest responsible bidder, or on that bidder‟s refusal or failure to execute a tendered 
contract, be awarded to the third responsible bidder and so on, unless it is determined by the 
authority that the acceptance of a responsible bid is not in the best interest of the authority, in 
which case all bids shall be rejected under its own discretion.   
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 In most theoretical as well as empirical studies the conditions of free competition are 
assumed, and thus conclusions are subject to competitive behaviour. Plessner (1971) has 
shown how partial market equilibria for various leading firm and monopolistic structures can 
be computed in the context of an agricultural economy. In the real world, however, non-
competitive structures are quite common and deserve no less but, from several viewpoints, 
more attention than competitive ones. Weverbergh (1979) has analysed Competitive Bidding 
with Asymmetric Information in the context of the problem, formerly treated by Wilson: two 
parties have to submit bids for an object. One of them knows the value with certainty, the 
other does not. The equilibrium derived differs from Wilson's solution and yields a simple 
explanation for the case cited by Wilson: the value of the game is essentially zero for the 
party with incomplete information. Earlier, Wilson (1967) treated the issue of competitive 
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bidding (via sealed tenders) under uncertainty when one of the parties knows the value of the 
prize with certainty. E. Diekmann, (1994) developed a method for quantifying and measuring 
the effectiveness of contractors competing for a cost-plus contract has been developed. Topcu 
(2004) proposes a multi-criteria decision model for construction contractor selection in the 
Turkish public sector. Current selection methods are reviewed and three main concepts are 
generated for selection: cost, time, and quality. The proposed selection model uses evaluation 
criteria related to these concepts and has a process with two main stages: contractor pre 
qualification and the choice of the eligible (compromised) bidder among pre-qualified 
contractors. This model can be used as a decision support system by project owners in order 
to identify an eligible contractor to be awarded the contract. In the recent past, Momani 
(2000) suggested that the insights provided should be taken seriously and provide a basis for 
thinking about the implications for future development of the construction industry where as 
Frank C. Harris (1997) proposes a quantitative model for selecting construction contractors 
which utilizes the multi-attribute analysis technique is being developed. Prequalification 
criteria for inclusion in the model have been identified and weightings to mirror their 
respective importance in the selection process determined.  Skitmore (1994) presented a 
systematic multi criterion decision analysis technique to describe the contractor selection and 
bid evaluation based on utility theory. Several variations of MAA (Multi-Attribute Analysis) 
are presented by Harris (1994) and the fundamental advantages and disadvantages associated 
with each are highlighted. An overview of a three-tier MAA procedure designed to 
encompass the entire selection process culminates in a worked example of contractor 
evaluation utilizing a computer spreadsheet approach. While the procedure is presented in a 
construction contracting context, the methodologies cited are of potential benefit in a wide 
selection of purchasing scenarios. As such, no such significant work has been found with 
particular reference to the public sector organisations based on natural selection mechanism 
where transparency in the selection process is ensured, primarily. Hope, this paper will 
attempt to fill up that caveat. 
 
The organisation of this paper is as follows: Section 3 evaluates the current methodology of 
competitive bidding in public sector followed by the introduction and review of literature in 
Section 1& 2, respectively. In Section 4, the methodological issues arising out of different 
variation in Competitive Bidding is discussed in detail along with the Proposed Proposition 
and the related issues. Limitation of the study is mentioned in Section 6 followed by objective 
of the paper. The paper concludes in Section 7. 
 
3. EVALUATION OF CURRENT METHODOLOGY FOR PUBLIC SECTOR  
The generally accepted tender selection process involves choosing the contractor quoting the 
least cost subject to a pre-specified level of technical efficiency as desired by the authority. 
This type of selection methodology sometimes termed as competitive bidding. The 
contractors among the short listed contractors ultimately end up with quoting least cost. 
Nevertheless, to mention that under traditionally accepted methodology of Competitive 
bidding, the available lowest bid is assumed to be synonymous to competitive bid. Though, in 
contemporary economic literature, the notion of competitive price is the lowest among all 
type of market conditions. The salient feature of pure competition is not reflected in the 
selection process. Automatically, available lowest bid appears as a proxy for competitive 
bidding due to the absence of free market mechanism. The availability of relatively smaller 
numbers of potential contractors, further, restraints the bid amount to reach its true 
competitive level. Hence, available lowest bid should not be identified as competitive 
bidding. Keeping this view in mind, several attempts have been made to modify the 
methodology of competitive bidding in several dimensions to make it competitive in true 
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sense, particularly, in public sector. In Denmark, for example, the two highest and the two 
lowest tenders are excluded and the closest to the average of the remaining bids is selected. A 
similar procedure is used in Italy, Portugal, Peru, and South Korea, but with only the lowest 
and highest being excluded. In Saudi Arabia, the lowest bidder is selected provided that the 
bid is not less than 70% of the owner's cost estimate. In Canada and the USA, especially in 
the public sector, the "lowest bidder" is selected, but a bid bond in an amount equal to 10% of 
the bid price also has to be provided. The French practice is to exclude bids which appear to 
be abnormally low. In all cases, bid prices are the sole basis for contractor selection and 
competition. 
 
4. OBJECTIVE 
 The above mentioned selection methodology across the countries never takes the benefit of 
the competitive structure or rivalry situation among the contractors which could have been 
improved the solution in terms of lower project cost of the authority and thereby saved 
resources. Whatever be the difference of quoted amount among the least cost bidder and the 
other short listed candidate (even if it may be $1), the authority has to choose the least price 
bidder among them as a part of economic efficiency. Each time, whenever any tender is 
awarded by any type of authority, the people expect some sort of lack of transparency except 
that person who ultimately awarded that tender and the authority who select that contractor 
subject to the rules and regulation of the competing authority. The main reason behind this 
type of allegation arises as the existing selection procedure does not posses the criteria of 
natural selection and the present system sometimes are synonymous of winning a lottery like 
situation. 
Against this backdrop, this paper tries to propose an alternative methodology of improving 
the economic efficiency of the project subject to the desired level of technical efficiency. The 
generally accepted methodology runs in terms of optimizing economic efficiency subject to a 
desired level of technical efficiency through competitive bidding (?). But competitive bidding 
in this type of situation may not be competitive in true sense as some sort of asymmetry of 
information persists among the competent contractors which ultimately restrains a pure 
competitive solution (as it is demanded in the traditional and generally accepted 
methodology). As a result, this asymmetry of information gives birth to the rumour of lack of 
transparency among the unsatisfied bidders and general public. To ensure transparency in the 
selection process and finding true competitive solution, the authority should take the 
advantage of this asymmetry of information by making it symmetrical and equally available 
among other short listed contractors to lower the project cost. The present paper attempts to 
concentrate on this particular issue and tries to propose an ad new dimension to the existing  
methodology to select the actual least cost bidder by taking advantage of the rivalry nature 
among the short listed candidate instead of selecting the simply quoting the least cost in a 
sealed envelope. 
 
5. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
The basic premises are that in case of composite quotation, consisting of several sub-
quotations, the overall lowest bid is actually the minimum of the aggregate of all sub-
quotation. The aggregate of the minimum of sub-quotation may further be lowered than the 
available “lowest bid” (traditionally which is known as the Competitive bid). In view of this 
possibility, this paper attempts to develop a method of analyzing and processing composite 
quotation so as to explore the possibility of pulling down the quoted price lower than the 
initially quoted “lowest bid” through the use of Reverse Delphi method which is a variation 
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of the classic Delphi
1
 technique to judge the efficiency of the short listed contractors not 
through experts‟ opinion appointed by the authority rather selecting the most (economically) 
efficient one through natural selection among the contractors in a transparent way.  
5.1 Model: Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that the tender should be awarded 
to the single firm and responsibility of executing the project shall be vested on that firm 
accordingly.  
Let, „M‟ denotes the number of Contractors submitting the tender; and „m‟ denotes the 
number of contractors satisfying the quality specification as specified by the authority. 
Definitely, m≤ M. It is, further, assumed that the actual tender consists of „n‟ number of 
specification (may be spitted as separate sub-tender). On the other hand, the short listed 
contractors who ultimately qualified for price bid may be described as following:   
The set of short listed contractors and the set of composite specification may be written as T 
= {T1, T2,…..Tm} and S={S1, S2,…..Sn}, respectively where as the decision matrix 
consisting of Composite quotation for the short listed contractors qualifying for price bid may 
be expressed as follows:         
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Competitive Bidding (Tc) is achieved as Min Ti = 
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  for all  i = 1,2,…….m 
Where, Sj: j
th
 specification of tender;  
             Ti: i
th
 short listed Contractor‟s bidding price of the project; and 
             tij : Price bid submitted by i
th
 contractor for j
th
 specification 
             for all   i= 1,2,…..m & j=1,2,…….n. 
The generally accepted methodology for selection of contractor ends up with Min Ti = 
1
n
ij
j
t

   
for all i = 1,2,…….m    as the Competitive Bidding (TC) Price and the tender is awarded 
accordingly. 
However, the authority could have improved the solution by making it more competitive 
through the natural selection mechanism from the short listed candidates. For this, the present 
paper deals with the following proposition: 
5.2 Proposition: The so called competitive Contractor solution (Tc) may be improved in the 
final stage (TF) with a savings of Resources for the authority by the amount (Tc - TF) ≥ 0 
through the use of Reverse Delphi method among the short listed contractors qualified for 
Price bid. 
5.2.1 Proof: First of all, the authority should take utmost care in preparing the project with 
different sub-specification so that in due course of time the information gathered may be used 
for making the transparent decision in selecting the contractor. The advertisement should be 
done accordingly. In the advertisement notice, suppliers would be asked to include detailed 
cost breakdown with their price quotations and the difference between buyers cost analysis 
and the suppliers cost breakdown need to be examined to arrive at mutually agreed figure that 
is the minimum price, which is normally expected. After collecting sealed envelope from the 
prospectus contractors, the authority is expected to ensure maximum number of eligible 
                                                 
1
 To reach at a consciousness of opinion among the panel of experts. 
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contractors competing for the tender to be awarded. As the numbers of prospectus contractors 
are relatively high as compared to number of different sub-specification advertised by the 
authority, it will automatically create some sort of pressure upon the price to be quoted for 
different subs-specifications. After this stage, the authority has to evaluate the different 
contractors‟ capability to implement the proposed project through proper evaluation of tender 
in terms of technical and quality specification. The objective of any authority is to achieve the 
desired level of quality requirement of any project by sacrificing minimum possible resources 
to implement that project. Emphasis on any one aspect and not the other will simply impede 
the basic requirement of any project. Hence, the authority should take utmost care to 
guarantee this quality requirement and should not compromise in any way with this technical 
efficiency of the proposed project. The initial short listing with respect to quality 
specification is, otherwise, essential for proper implementation of the proposed project. Once, 
this quality requirement is fulfilled, and then the authority should concentrate on achieving 
that at lowest possible price by applying the Darwinian natural selection mechanism through 
Reverse Delphi method. The precondition to apply this Reverse Delphi method is to ensure at 
least m ≥ (n+1) number of contractors at this stage where „n‟ denotes the number of sub-
specification and remaining one correspond to the so called Competitive Price bidder from 
traditional methodology. At this stage, the Authority Tender (TA) is prepared by considering 
the finally short listed contractors who ultimately qualify for price bid with respect to each 
sub-specification (by adding the column minimum  tij*) which is as under 
      TA =
1
*
n
ij
j
t

 , where again, tij* = Min tij for all i= 1, 2,…..m & j=1, 2,…….n. 
Definitely, TA ≤ Tc 
Note in this context that the number of short listed contractors further reduced to (n + 1) 
where „n‟ corresponds to number of hierarchy and the remaining one corresponds to overall 
minimum or Tc. After displaying the authority tender, TA, short listed candidate are invited to 
revise their estimates against this authority tender, TA. 
In case, if there exist any tie in terms of minimum cost quoted by any contractor; the 
maximum number of finally short listed contractors further shrinks to {n + 1 – Number of 
Tie}. Lastly, the authority should take some judicious decision in selecting the contractor to 
be awarded. For this, instead of applying expert panel of the authority, let the Contractors to 
express their opinion in terms of their revised estimates (as such they are the experts and the 
process will continue until and unless consensus of opinion takes place). In this sense, it is 
the „Reverse‟ Delphi method where consensus of opinion is achieved through direct 
participation of the Contractors and not by the authority. 
Ultimately, the FINAL tender will be awarded (TF). 
However, it is clear that TA ≤ TF ≤ Tc. 
The difference between (Tc - TF) ≥ 0 is the net savings of resources to the authority. 
5.2.2. Special Case: if tkj = t*kj holds for all j= 1,2,…….n then it is best result derived from 
the traditional methodology of competitive bidding and, accordingly, TA = TF = Tc holds and 
the K
th
 Contractor will be awarded the contract automatically. Since, Tk = Min Ti = 
1
n
ij
j
t

 = 
1
*
n
ij
j
t

  for all i=1,2,…m 
5.2.3 Lemma: In the process of revision of estimates by the different contractors, the 
application of Reverse Delphi Technique may encourage the formation of one or more 
cluster(s) among themselves in order to strengthen their relative bargaining power in the 
subsequent stages to achieve the joint profit maximisation.  
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The potential threats of losing the whole contract force the relatively weak contractors to 
negotiate with the leaders which automatically reduce the number of potential contractors in 
the subsequent stages.    
 
6. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
This paper is primarily based on the restrictive assumption regarding the objective of the 
authority of any public sector organisations which seeks to achieve the economic efficiency 
subject to a given level of technical efficiency. If the authority sticks to its position and try to 
lower down the quoted price below the threshold limit, it may lead to some sort of 
compromise with the desired level of technical efficiency in terms of the flow of quality of 
services. Moreover, if the tendency of quoting price below the threshold limit is not 
controlled, it may lead to some sort of negotiation among the prospective contractors before 
the game is played which ultimately may restraints the essence of the proposed methodology 
and its implementation in desired direction. 
 
7. CONCLUSION  
This paper has tried to propose an ad new dimension to the methodology of selection of 
appropriate contractor in a transparent way through the Reverse Delphi Method. The 
application of the proposed method is mainly meant for the Government sector/ Government 
Regulated organisations since the selection process in these sectors are always attracting the 
eyebrow of the Society. In other words, the private organisations have always enjoyed a 
greater degree of flexibility in the bargaining process  as compared to that of the Government 
regulated industry/ organisations in  selecting the appropriate contractors. Moreover, the 
Government/ Government regulated organisations are always suffered from the lack of 
confidence in the selection process since the society itself works as a watchdog in the 
selection procedures. A slight deviation from the prescribed rules and regulation leads to 
huge rumour among the public which force them to escape from the unnecessary 
departmental hazards. As a result, the solution always never able to touch the true 
competitive solution rather ends up with the sub-optimal solution. The non competitive 
structure in terms of fewer firms restraints the true essence of competitive solution. The 
application of proposed Reverse Delphi method can achieve the true competitive solution in a 
purely non-competitive structure.  
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